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WHY REASON, WHY NOW?
In 1977, the New Yorker published a 3-part essay by Hannah Arendt, the first one alone 
running over 76 pages, albeit frequently interrupted by adverts for tobacco, airlines, and 
alcohol. In it, Arendt reflects on the serialization, some 14 years earlier, of her book 
Eichmann in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1963). Like few others, the phrase “banality of evil” aligns 
the murderous machinations that clouded an entire historical epoch with the ruthless and 
essentially unthinking rationality of a bureaucratic apparatus. And for Eichmann: 
… he did not enter the Party out of conviction, nor did he ever become convinced by 
it; whenever he was asked to give his reasons, he repeated a set of embarrassed 
clichés about the Treaty of Versailles and unemployment. Rather, “it was like being 
swallowed up by the Party against all expectations and without previous decision,” he 
said in court, adding, “it happened so quickly and suddenly.” He had no time and less 
desire to be properly informed; he did not even know the Party program, and he had 
not read (as he never did read) “Mein Kampf” (Arendt, Feb. 1963, no page). 
Not ideology, hatred, envy, or wickedness, but organizing and managing, hierarchies, 
efficiencies, spreadsheets and targets animate this kind of evil, and although the truth of 
Eichmann’s contribution to the logistical efficiency of such a monstrous machinery was 
never in question, his defense consisted in his unwillingness or incapacity to think and grasp 
its meaning and consequences. Arendt (1977) insists that truth and meaning are not the same: 
The intellect (Verstand) is concerned with cognition, knowing, and factual truth, while reason 
(Vernunft) concerns thinking, and it is the task of education to generate both. Arendt is 
placing reason in an elevated role. It is more than perceptual awareness, more than habituated 
framing of patterned behavior, more than means–end calculation: It is an ethical capacity in 
which those with reason are able to discern good reasons for acting from reasons.  
This text is not just remarkable for its depth and precision, but also because such a 
dense essay, invoking hefty philosophical ideas, citing passages in Latin, French, and 
German, was published in a general interest magazine, when nowadays, especially in 
business and management journals, engagement with philosophical sources is often frowned 
upon. Arendt investigates reason against the backdrop of destruction, devastation, and 
persecution, followed by the anxieties of the Cold War. Since the publication of her essay, 
intermitting years of relative peace for many in the West at least, of economic progress, and 
of the shift from state control to the organizations of the free market, have let the question of 
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the rationality and the need for thinking slide again into the background. Yet the tremors 
heralding our own times bring Arendt’s concerns back into focus: Climate emergency; 
environmental destruction; mental health crises; hunger and obesity; economic and social 
inequities across geographies, genders and skin colors, all undergirded by the question of 
who is allowed to live; wars over oil; the displacement of work by robots and artificial 
intelligence, which loops back into our lives through the gamified exploitation and 
manipulation of behavior, attention spans, and desire; the polarization of politics in culture 
wars, and spread of disease. All this is coupled with the decline of old institutions and the 
technologically mediated transformation of public discourse. To once again raise the question 
of reason, as did Arendt, and set it against the decision-making intellect, is to ask what kinds 
of organizations and institutions we want, and how to live our lives, how we judge values and 
actions, and how—in light of such thinking—we offer insights to those conceiving, working 
in, and affected by the organizational forces of trade.  
INSTRUMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
At his 1961 trial in Jerusalem,  which Arendt covered for the New Yorker, Eichmann argued 
his role as one of the architects and administrative enablers of genocide was warranted by 
instructions: He was doing the bidding of a superior force. That force was not just the law, 
but what lay behind the law, its spirit: The “superior laws” of the German Fuhrer. He had, he 
said, done his duty, not blindly, but as a reasoning, self-legislating being, acting: 
fully within the framework of the kind of judgment required of him: he acted in 
accordance with the rule, examined the order issued to him for its "manifest" legality, 
namely regularity; he did not have to fall back upon his "conscience," since he was 
not one of those who were unfamiliar with the laws of his country. The exact opposite 
was the case (Arendt, 1964: Postscript).
Rather than questioning his duties, Eichmann had, it seems, found in reason a means 
for their further entrenchment. However, for Arendt, the version of reason invoked by 
Eichmann was no reason at all. Rather, it was a form of active obedience exercised through 
procedural conformity and means–end calculation. Through this thoughtless instrumentality, 
Eichmann was able to sheath radical evil with organizational monotony. Arendt argued that 
aspects of Eichmann’s defense serve as a warning lest we let real reason—the moral capacity 
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to continually question prevailing identities and interests—sleep. Without it who knows 
which further horrors might emerge?     
In part, Arendt’s warning is heeded, given the repeated political and legal attempts to 
rescind the authority of those who might otherwise ride roughshod over the human capacity 
for questioning. Yet in activities of trade, military policy, and international relations, 
instrumental thinking has grown in dominance, and it is toward these activities that many 
who are taught in business schools look to develop their careers. Here, to be rational is 
precisely not to question the organizational aims of growth, profit, influence, and survival, for 
this gets us, practically speaking, nowhere. Rather, to be rational is to frame organizational 
experience by identifying feasible courses of action from among differing options that are 
ranked according to beliefs about the likelihood and desirability of their outcomes. These 
beliefs, too, can be represented in instrumentally rational terms, aiming at truth, error 
avoidance, explanatory power, consistency, clarity, and so on (Nozick, 1993: 65).   
This transformation away from morality was catalyzed by the association of reason 
with “utility,” meaning a property in any object producing “benefit, advantage, pleasure good 
or happiness” (Bentham, 1789), thus shifting the focus toward the mental states produced 
through action, and toward calculative maximization whereby reason can justifiably and 
sensibly overrule immediate desire if, thereby, a greater balance of utility is realized. This 
paved the way for more general and non-psychological variants of utility maximization 
informing the emerging discipline of political economy, and then, modern rational choice 
theory. In management learning and education, tools such as planning, strategic management, 
and decision analysis have been the upshot of this development, becoming the de facto 
standard, comprising technologies of rationality and professionalizing the procedures and 
organizational roles associated with, and accepted as, proper management conduct. These 
technologies do not just require “exquisite talents,” but also considerable training, indicated 
by the growth of the business education sector (March, 2006: 201). 
The instrumental emphasis on maximizing utility through the knowledgeable use of 
rational controls found iconic form in the scientific management of Frederick W. Taylor 
(1967: 6) whose project of “greater efficiency” through “task management” promised greater 
cost efficiency and productivity. He applied scientific principles to measuring work 
performance activity, suggesting ways to intensify task activity without degrading the quality 
of work (Wren & Bedeian, 2009: 126–127). Essentially limitless in character (Wang et al., 
2012), this logic of measurement surveillance and incremental reorganization remains 
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focused on the cognitive challenge of arranging means to attain given ends, without itself 
stipulating, questioning, or reflecting on the ends pursued in such activity.
Taken as an explanatory or normative theory, the forms of managerial instrumentality 
taught in business schools not only require that the most efficient and effective course of 
action is pursued, but also that the decision was made using probabilistic calculations of 
means–ends connections on the basis of verifiable and credible information: In other words, 
decisions can be neither capricious nor random. The growing sophistication of these 
calculations has given rise to elaborate game-theoretical operations, for example Axelrod and 
O’Keohane’s (1985) studies of how the payoff structures in Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios 
influence the possibilities for political cooperation. This form of game theory analysis takes 
into consideration successive feedback cycles, the potential discounting of future outcomes, 
the potential for (not individually rational, collective contracts) cooperation, as well as 
changes in the very parameters or sums of the game, influenced by interdependently 
unfolding decisions (Elster, 1984).
The gains of such instrumental rationality are evidential: Organizations have presence 
in the world like never before, almost to the point where nothing is unorganized. It is a 
presence configured through the gathering and analysis of information through which rational 
decision-making is enabled and warranted. Taylor’s process and efficiency observations of 
workplace activity were undoubtedly at the vanguard. There was something beguiling about 
representing work patterns in the form of abstracted calculations whose promise of control 
was framed with the neat, compartmentalized obsession of a Muybridge photograph. But 
Taylor’s work was but one component in a wider array of rational decision-making 
procedures working their way into all aspects of organizational life. Accounting, 
administration, and auditing processes were the original ones, without which, arguably, there 
is no organization (Puyou & Quattrone, 2020), and as technologically mediated information 
grew in complexity and range, procedures came in more specific areas of management, such 
as finance and strategy (Cortada, 2016: 109–11). 
With scientific management an advocacy of generic standards and calculable aims 
which simply ignores the opaque question of whether the logic by which the aims are set is 
itself appropriate (Akrivou & Bradbury-Huang, 2015). The emphasis is on the aim of 
improving returns for owners and workers alike, thereby maximizing utility. With the 
massive growth of mediating technology—attributed in part to the success of scientific 
rationality—reasoning has become almost synonymous with information processing 
enhanced by digitized analysis (Kiechel, 2010), and management practice—and education—
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has veered ever more toward being a technical exercise of framing and pursuing performance 
indicators, integrating governance systems, emulating best-practice performance, and 
enacting and even embodying assessment and surveillance systems.
If, like Davies (2019) we have worries about this uncritical expansion of the 
instrumental conception of rationality, we shouldn’t, because, unlike any other, this 
conception is capable of self-correction. One recent and prominent exponent of this view is 
the evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (2018). Pinker expresses belief in evolution and 
the capability of the “human brain” to reason if and when standards of argument, logic, and 
fact are sufficiently developed: “Making the world more rational, then, is not just a matter of 
training people to be better reasoners and setting them loose. It also depends on the rules of 
discourses in workplaces, social circles and arenas of debate and decision-making” (Pinker, 
2018: 379) which, for Pinker, means that in public discourse, “issues should be depoliticized 
as much as is feasible” and “factual state of affairs should be unbundled from remedies that 
are freighted with symbolic political meaning.” It was a similar notion of rationality that 
drove Taylor’s defense of his methods: parse work processes into units; attribute outputs to 
each; suggest alternatives. Scientific management is based on fact revealed by the application 
of scientific principles of observation and evaluation, and it purports to benefit employers, 
managers, and owners as well as workers, employees, and the general public thereby, 
pretending, at least implicitly, that is possible to depoliticize organizations. The job is to 
observe and measure accurately, minutely, and dispassionately, from which assessment one 
can calculate the utility gained, set against the utility generated by possible alternatives: keep 
observing, experimenting, and improving. If one technique or operational experiment fails to 
work—and most of Taylor’s suggestions, for example, did not work, indeed the Bethlehem 
Steel company where he worked attested to having lost money as a result of his managerial 
interventions (Wrege & Hodgetts, 2000)—then try another. Behavior and outcomes become 
more explainable and predictable (mediated by a welter of files, manuals, handbooks, 
procedural reporting structures, surveillance systems, and other technologies), and the 
organization grows. 
THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
The growth is also the problem: As science advances and organization spreads, the scope for 
autonomous expression, judgment, and feeling weakens to the point where the distance 
between rationality and tyranny appears small. This paradoxical tendency of rationality to 
oust itself has famously received the name dialectic of Enlightenment. The struggle of the 
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Enlightenment against superstition and ignorance through the commitment to the free use of 
reason and the development of the institution of science has played a prominent role at least 
since the latter parts of the 17th century (Israel, 2001). What is at stake in the discussions of 
Enlightenment is the crucial question of whether reason “works”, that is, the question of 
“progress.” In the seminal conception of Immanuel Kant, the process of Enlightenment is 
conceived broadly in terms of our “emergence from […] self-incurred immaturity” (Kant 
1784). Kant’s Enlightenment philosophy develops the basic idea that commitment to 
cultivate independent, critical thought can lead to individual and societal progress also in 
terms of moral or ethical dispositions and aesthetic taste. Arendt places herself in this 
tradition when she claims that a broad, moral conception of reason is irreducible. Pinker 
(2018), on the other hand, advocates a narrower “scientific” conception of Enlightenment that 
has a more specific understanding of the conditions of progress. According to scientific 
Enlightenment, what has so far ensured and what will continue to guarantee linear human 
progress is the cultivation of instrumental rationality that adheres to the methodological 
foundations of the natural sciences and pursues technological modulation of individual 
behavior, societal structures, and natural environments. Pinker has been criticized for 
narrowly focusing on the part of the Enlightenment tradition that focuses on a commitment to 
the civilizing potential of the natural sciences and technological innovation (Smith, 2019: 
10). 
Following the passage of the 20th century, and in particular in light of the evil 
unleashed by Eichmann and his ilk, critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. 
Adorno expressed a profound pessimism vis-à-vis the ability of instrumental rationality and 
its expressions in science and technology to ensure unambiguous human progress. In 1944, 
they wrote: “Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has 
always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the 
wholly enlightened world is radiant with triumphant calamity” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002: 
1). In the fundamental self-critique of reason that Adorno and Horkheimer elaborate, 
scientific enlightenment is in essence an attempt to increase human control in individual self-
relations, in social relations and in our relation to nature. However, this attempt to install 
ourselves as masters again and again results in calamitous setbacks that undermine human 
control and meaningfulness on the personal, societal, and ecological level. Recently, in the 
light of developments such as social media echo-chambers and Western populism, the 
dialectic critique of Enlightenment rationality propounded by Horkheimer and Adorno has 
inspired historian of science Justin Smith to not only repeat the critique of naïve faith in the 
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linear progress of scientific Enlightenment, but also to warn that it is “irrational to seek to 
eliminate irrationality both in our society and in our own exercise of our mental capacities” 
(Smith, 2019: 6). 
The dialectic critique of Enlightenment also implicitly underlies some of the 
ecological critics of modern civilization and its destructive effects on natural habitats and 
ecosystems, its responsibility for the ongoing mass extinction of animal species and its 
disruptive influence on the climate through the emission of greenhouse gasses. According to 
writer and environmental activist Bill McKibben’s influential book, The End of Nature from 
1989, for example, modern human civilization had at that point “so altered the planet that not 
an inch was beyond our control” (McKibben, 2019:1). This idea was later underlined and 
developed by scientists in the beginning of the new millennium when they began referring to 
our era as the Anthropocene. Recently, McKibben sharpened his diagnosis of the looming 
dialectic reversal threatening humankind, that is, the ecological destruction and technological 
hubris of modern civilization, which now in his view endangers “the human experiment” as 
such. 
With its focus on reason and rationality in management learning and education, this 
Special Issue intervenes in the current discussion of a broad, moral conception of reason 
versus a more narrow notion of instrumental rationality, as well as in the debate between 
proponents of scientific Enlightenment and advocates of a fundamental self-critique of reason 
who argue for a reappraisal of the Enlightenment tradition. 
THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY IN BUSINESS EDUCATION
According to Rakesh Khurana’s From Higher Aims to Hired Hands, a broader commitment 
to moral and civic values originally played an important part in the conception of 
professionalism that oriented management learning and education (Khurana, 2005). 
However, this civic and moral conception of professionalism was gradually replaced by a 
concept of general-managerial professionalism in which economics and decision-science 
figured strongly. The theoretical picture of the instrumentally rational, utility maximizing 
agent orienting future managers, and especially the notion of utility interpreted in terms of 
cost efficiency, profit, or simply shareholder value has been criticized for having detrimental 
consequences for management practice (Ghoshal, 2005; Sullivan, 2011, Landfester & 
Metelmann, 2019, Amann et al., 2011). However, it is both intellectually as well as 
practically inadequate to reduce rationality to the figure of the homo economicus, a 
“skeleton” already almost a century ago condemned by Friedrich A. Hayek into “the closet of 
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economics” (see Slobodian & Plehwe, 2020: 5). Although the logic of instrumental and 
scientific rationalism remains deeply engrained in much theory about management and the 
pedagogies of management education, there is also a substantial and growing concern about 
the limits of the pursuit of instrumental rational progress, and the capability to address wide-
ranging and complex problems in terms of task management and the pursuit of efficiency 
(Joullie, 2016). 
Perhaps the most frequently acknowledged factor slowing down progress is the 
human decision maker whose cognitive information processing capabilities continuously run 
against the complexities and time-pressures of the tasks that have to be decided upon. Herbert 
Simon famously highlights a satisficing form of problem solving and decision-making that 
refrains from seeking the perfectly rational and instead “sets an aspiration level, searches 
until an alternative is found that is satisfactory by the aspiration level criterion, and selects 
that alternative” (Simon, 1972: 168; Simon, 1955). The modification of rationality as a 
descriptive approach has been carried further by the heuristic and bias-tradition in behavioral 
economics. Daniel Kahneman thus describes his and Amos Tversky’s contribution as an 
attempt “to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that 
separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and 
choices assumed in rational-agent models” (Kahneman, 2003: 1449; cf., 1470). 
One way of dealing with such human biases is to develop decision practices that 
provide “cognitive repair.” Denise Rousseau, in her essay The Realist Rationality of 
Evidence-Based Management here, elaborates how in drawing on evidence-based professions 
such as medicine, managerial decision processes can be modeled that mitigate human 
limitations, in particular when the production and analysis of evidence is coupled with 
engaged decision-making. In so improving access and use of quality information and in 
developing aides to facilitate processes of evidence-based decision-making, self-interest and 
other partisan influences can be alleviated, improving not just the quality of decisions, but 
also expanding the frame of what is taken into consideration. In this way, decision-making 
can be liberating, as it has the capacity to overcome conservative bias, consider critical 
alternatives, and exert “free will,” and promote broader attention to interests and concerns of 
a wider range of organizational stakeholders. 
A different approach to the question of human bias and limits is offered by José 
Lejarraga and Maud Pindard, in their article Bounded Rationality: Cognitive Limitations or 
Adaptation to the Environment? in this Special Issue. Lejarraga and Pindard question this 
negative interpretation of the role of bounded rationality and by revising the work of Simon 
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and in particular Gerd Gigerenzer, to fashion a positive “ecologically rational” account that 
locates in managerial heuristics central mechanisms capable of responding to changing, 
uncertain, and complex environments, which are typical in managerial work. According to 
Lejarraga and Pindard, the ecological framework is a distinctly different conception than the 
bias and heuristic research program; although both are rooted in Simon’s conception of 
bounded rationality. Viewing heuristics as more than a poor alternative to perfect decision-
making processes allows for the consideration of how heuristics can be studied, refined, and 
taught in their own right. Lejarraga and Pindard’s embrace of heuristics falls into a wider 
spectrum of responses that veer away from the pursuit of optimal solutions of rational choice 
theory. Some even suggest the abdication of rationality altogether, instead entertaining 
“absurdity,” “play,” “luck,” “spirituality,” or “mindfulness” (Wagner, 1978; Gebauer, 2012; 
Izak, 2015; Newark, 2017); non-rational immediate action based on “enthusiasm,” 
“confidence,” and “improvisation” (Cunha et al., 2015); bricolage, practical coping (Dey & 
Mason, 2018); managing as art and craft (Mintzberg, 2004), and pastoral judgment (Holt, 
2018).
In his review of William Davies’ book, Nervous States: Democracy and the Decline 
of Reason, Caleb Bernacchio elaborates further on this trend away from rational decision- 
making, emphasizing Davies’ central claim that the ideal of expertise as a neutral source of 
factual knowledge is an early modern conception that has been decisively undermined, and 
cannot be pieced back together. Knowledge has become irreversibly politicized, and given 
growing inequality, ubiquitous examples of elite corruption, and the looming threat of 
climate change, we should no longer require the public to accept the claims of experts and 
their evidence at face value. If we accept Davies’ argument, it not only has profound 
consequences for our notion of democracy, but also, as Bernacchio emphasizes, provides 
support for the contemporary call for participatory or inclusive modes of management and 
governance in organizations and challenges us to reconceive what it means to manage on the 
basis of evidence.  
In their article here on the Lessons From Creating a Business School for Public Good, 
Martin Kitchener and Rick Delbridge focus precisely on the challenge of creating a more 
inclusive mode of governance within the business school. Their contribution highlights how 
business schools are not only engaged with the question of the rational ends of managing in 
terms of the educational content they purvey (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005), but also in their 
organizational purposes and aims, as they are themselves economic units. Kitchener and 
Delbridge invoke Max Weber’s notion of substantive rationality to analyze their own 
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experience of attempting the instituting of an approach that does not narrow reason to 
instrumental rationality. Instead, they model a substantively rational “Public Value Business 
School,” which considerers a multitude of stakeholders and wider concerns through 
transparent and inclusive management. Kitchener and Delbridge reflect on the “oblique” 
approaches they used when developing their ideas, convincing others and enacting new 
practices, illustrating empirically the difficulties of narrating and legitimizing a strategy that 
is non-instrumental in widening the scope of objectives, with multiple stakeholders in mind. 
Kitchener and Delbridge’s empirical illustrations are complemented by Johan Gersel 
and Rasmus Johnsen’s article Toward a Novel Theory of Rational Managerial Deliberation: 
Stakeholders, Ethical Values, and Corporate Governance. Gersel and Johnsen address the 
theoretical challenge of attaining rationality when faced with a multitude of goals. Analyzing 
Michael Jensen’s (1976, 2001) influential work on agency theory that views humans as 
rational agents whenever they are “maximizers” of an abstract unity such as “utility,” 
“satisfaction,” or “welfare,” the authors identify in this as well as many other influential 
management theories an underlying single-purpose logic that is inherently incompatible with 
multiple purposes and ends. Turning to the work of contemporary philosopher Robert 
Brandom, they continue to develop an alternative, pragmatist account of conceptual 
understanding capable of moving “beyond” single-purpose shareholder accounts and 
compensating for human biases, following up on Ghoshal’s (2005) call for more adequate 
and ethically justifiable management theories. By developing a theoretical approach for how 
to learn to deliberate contextually on management dilemmas, they also challenge the 
confinement of rationality to context-independent rules that still inform evidence-based 
management (Rousseau, 2006: 261), and also underpin the bias and heuristic tradition.
 
 
RATIONALITY, REASON AND THINKING
In their above-mentioned contributions to this Special Issue, Gersel and Johnsen, Kitchener 
and Delbridge, Lejarraga and Pindard as well as Rousseau expand the limitations of single-
purpose conceptions of reason in more or less radical ways, offering a broader consideration 
of factors, curbing the excesses of otherwise unbridled value-maximizing progress. In this 
they elaborate a set of concerns already formulated by the posterchild of economically 
rational thinking, Adam Smith, whose Theory of Moral Sentiments invokes the figure of an 
impartial spectator to temper the moral blindness of the invisible hand, drawn up in the 
Wealth of Nations. Jörg Metelmann and Ulrike Landfester, in their article, Back to the Roots: 
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Why Academic Business Schools Should Re-Radicalize Rationality  trace the educational 
lineage of the conceptualization of rationality from these beginnings in the attention Smith 
gives to feelings of both vanity and sentimentality, to Kant, whose view of reason was very 
much as a generative companion to aesthetic feeling that became manifest as taste. They go 
on to argue how it was these rich, moralized forms of reason that informed the emergence of 
universities in Europe, notably those informed by the educational thinking of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt and his conception of lifelong development, or Bildung, along with what Weber 
was to conceptualize as value-driven rationality. Business schools have lost their way, 
Metelmann and Landfester argue, because at each step of these developments, a concern with 
gain and influence meant Smith’s spectator, Kant’s taste, Humbold’s Bildung and finally 
Weber’s criticism of utility-driven rationality, were subverted, narrowed, or mistranslated 
into an instrumental concern for acquisition.  
In response, Metelmann and Landfester call for business school curricula to resist 
standardized procedures and become more open to doubt, not least by embodying difference 
and variation, even within the same subject matter. The diversity of pedagogic approaches in 
classrooms is further explored in Ashish Bhatia and Natalia Levina’s article The Diverse 
Rationalities of Entrepreneurship Education: Epistemic Stance Perspective. Based on an 
empirical study of entrepreneurship programs in three highly ranked U.S. MBA courses, the 
authors identify differences in the propositional attitudes, modes of engagement, and styles of 
reasoning, engendering substantially different “epistemic stances” in three nominally similar 
courses. Bhatia and Levina therefore not only identify how in each program different 
elements of entrepreneurship as a “mold breaking practice,” may be learned and how such 
differences are rooted in wider values and goals, but also how the very subject matter of 
entrepreneurship transgresses standardized ideas, flourishing instead through variation and 
differentiation. 
One specific example of this comes in form of Damian O’Doherty’s article The 
Leviathan of Rationality: Using Film to Develop Creativity and Imagination in Management 
Learning and Education, which takes leave from Kant’s aesthetics to analyze the educational 
effects of screenings and debates of the ethnographic film “Leviathan,” an immersive, 
impressionistic study of life at sea using disorientating, unnarrated impressions gleaned from 
arrays of cameras attached to an ocean-going fishing trawler. O’Doherty argues that the 
entanglements of the machinations of a swimming factory with the ferocity of nature through 
the intermingling of water and blood, foam and forms, brings forth into the classroom an 
affective awareness of a lack in human control, and hence epistemological doubt. 
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A similar dislocation of the human being animates the article by the writer collective 
Gasparin, Brown, Green, Hugill, Lilley, Quinn, Schinckus, Williams, and Zalasiewics, The 
Business School in the Anthropocene: Parasite Logic and Parasitical Reasoning for a 
Working Earth. This essay investigates the limits to human-centered, oftentimes economics-
focused models of reasoning when confronting self-referential and complex problems such as 
those posed by the Anthropocene with its rapidly unfolding climatic implications. Gasparin et 
al. (2020) elaborate an alternative, non-anthropocenic thinking, first through the framing of 
the human role in the conceptual language of parasitism, as developed by philosopher Michel 
Serres, thus opening up an interdependent, communicative set of relations in which the 
parasitic influence of humans on nature is mirrored by the parasitization of humans by other 
members of the ecology. Seeing humans as both parasites as well as host emphasizes the 
need for the recognition and safeguarding of reciprocal bonds to ensure the survival of the 
wider ecosystem. The authors continue with an example of slow design, analyzed through a 
non-anthropocentric method of “pataphysics” whose irreverent normalization of 
exceptionalism and anomaly forms the generative ground for the imagination of an 
alternative way of embracing the currently, and rapidly, unfolding climate reality. The 
Business School in the Anthropocene and The Leviathan of Rationality both implicitly draw 
on Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialectical critique of Enlightenment as well as on Friedrich 
Nietzsche (2006) and Sigmund Freud’s (2010) criticism of the Western tradition of 
rationality. In applying analyses from contemporary inheritors to these traditions, such as 
Serres and Gilles Deleuze, these two essays represent the most radical call to a self-critique 
of reason in management learning and education published here. 
It is in critically considering the effects of the potential discounting and setting aside of 
the human that Annika Skoglund’s review of Becoming Indigenous—Governing Imaginaries 
in the Anthropocene by David Chandler and Julian Reid is timely. If in the wake of the 
Anthropocene, we are being encouraged into a back-to-nature condition in which the capacity 
to act upon the world gives way to speculating from within a condition that is necessarily 
beyond our control. As we return to nature, just how far, asks Skoglund’s review, should we 
uncritically take on this mantle of vulnerability?
Another return to roots is in the form of a reconsideration of broader notions of 
reason, manifest prior to industrialization and even Enlightenment. Reason harks back to 
Socrates who, in Plato’s dialogues, conceives in terms of “giving an account,” that is,  
providing a consideration that bears on a question or speaks in favor of a course of action. 
Günter Figal, in his article Understanding Situations: A Hermeneutical Conception of 
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“Practical” Rationality, outlines Plato’s notion of reasoning in terms of a restrictive process 
in the form of opposition to and hindrance of human desire, and he contrasts this restrictive 
conception with Aristotle, who reserves a much more active role for reason, as the soul’s 
“leading and even primarily active part.” This notion of practical reasoning, involving 
investigation of how actions can be “decided, planned, performed, explained and, if 
necessary, justified,” has been subject to recurring debates in relation to education in business 
and management (e.g., Chia & Holt, 2008; Rooney, 2013; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014; 
Hartman, 2017). Recent philosophical works argue for the intrinsic connection between 
reason and agency and claim that the ability to take refuge in reasons is a condition for our 
“self-constitution” as human beings (McDowell, 1996, Korsgaard, 2009), and thus, also for 
agentic freedom. Figal emphasizes how reason is more than a matter of achieving one’s aims, 
but requires being alive to the indeterminateness of situational contexts by listening to the 
voices and concerns of others, and the possibilities and realities to which each individual—as 
a situated being—belongs. 
REASON AND THE FUTURE
According to the broad Aristotelian conception, reason is viewed as a dimension of human 
life that is always already familiar to us because it is to some degree embedded in societal 
institutions and cultural practices. This institutional and cultural embeddedness of reason has, 
of late, become mechanistic, meaning humans are less and less in a central role. Sam 
Horner’s review of Katherine Hayles’s book Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive 
Unconscious attests to such a condition. Horner’s review points to the increasingly fluid 
exchanges of information between humans and technological systems, whereby cognition 
extends beyond the confines of the human body; becoming active parts of distributed 
networks which switch, calculate, and modify information at speeds far beyond human 
capacity—and thus beyond human reason and control. This has meant managerial reasoning 
veering ever more toward being a technical exercise of framing and pursuing performance 
indicators, integrating governance systems, emulating best-practice performance, and 
enacting and even embodying assessment and surveillance systems (Kiechel, 2010). In a 
similar fashion, Shoshana Zuboff has thus recently warned that the notion of individual 
employees, users, customers, and citizens as ends in themselves whose freedom of choice 
must be respected is threatened in novel ways by our tacit acceptance of Google and 
Facebook’s “surveillance capitalism” through which we are increasingly being reduced to 
“the means to others’ ends” (Zuboff, 2019: 94). However, as Horner’s review shows, Hayles 
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goes further in her critique, as even those “others,” the captains of industry running IT giants 
are not ultimately in control, as they themselves are merely plugged into technological 
networks. 
Speculation about the future of a more fully technologized society is often the 
preserve of science fiction, frequently coining key terms and imageries, such as the 
cyberspace or androids far before they find their actual scientific realizations. Liu Cixin’s 
multi-award-winning book trilogy “Remembrance of Earth’s Past,” reviewed in this Special 
Issue by Norah Campbell, expands the frame of human reasoning not just beyond the 
terrestrial confines of Earth itself, but also beyond mortal time spans. Confronted with a 
hostile world in which human reason cannot find a foothold, Campbell’s review shows how 
Cixin conjures entirely new objects and relations, and how, in fictionally testing fact, science 
fiction writing ought to take seriously the forming of imaginaries that place the human 
relation to things in a far more equivocal and far less entitled way than do the Enlightened 
advocates of instrumental reason. Yet in Cixin there is also the sense of what reason can 
achieve, were it given the space to develop in synch with the dynamic rather than static 
nature of things, and were its exponents alive to an ever-present need for stealth and cunning: 
Indeed the central maxim of the trilogy, expanded in the “Dark Forest theory,” seems to be 
that standing in the light can kill you. Cixin’s novels imagine how desirable planet Earth 
must appear to aliens having to cope with far fewer stable homes: Indeed, it is so attractive 
they wish to colonize it, eliminating humanity in the process. They wish to have the planet to 
themselves. 
And with this we return to some of the fundamental themes of reason: of desire and 
temperance; of how one lives one’s life in the company of others who should remain just that, 
“others,” and how to design and use the technological systems that organize and control lives. 
Eichmann, too, had started as an ambitious youth: As a failed travelling salesman, he found 
that in the National Socialist bureaucracy, he “could start from scratch and make a career.” 
As Arendt (Feb 1963: no page) astutely highlights: “Eichmann, for the first time in his life, 
discovered in himself some special qualities. There were two things he could do well, or 
better than many other people: He could organize and he could negotiate.” But good 
organizing and negotiating are in themselves neither good nor bad, and without the critical 
company of reason they can be embodiments of pure evil. The preparation for such company 
is the subject matter of education: a task that has perhaps never been as important as it is 
now.
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